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Moira Gatens is widely celebrated as a ground-breaking feminist theorist. More 
generally, she is a distinguished political philosopher, whose work on the imagi-
nation as a productive source of reasoned action and liberation—of active and 
ethical sociability—enjoys a fecund global influence. Drawing upon key aspects of 
her feminist and political philosophy, the purpose of this article is to outline, in 
general terms, the significance of the contribution Gatens additionally and corre-
spondingly makes to Spinoza studies.1 This is a sustained contribution made over 
decades, including her 1996 book Imaginary Bodies: Ethics, Power and Corporeality 
and the collaborative work with Genevieve Lloyd, Collective Imaginings: Spinoza 
Past and Present, published in 1999. Gatens’ edited collection, Feminist Interpreta-
tions of Benedict Spinoza appeared in 2009, and likewise extends the contemporary 
reach and reception of Spinozan ideas. The impact of Gatens’ Spinoza, and the 
high esteem in which her interpretation of Spinoza is regarded, is also evident in 
a number of important lectures and talks given during invited fellowships abroad. 
Amongst these, in 2010 she held the prestigious title of Spinoza Chair at the Uni-
versity of Amsterdam; the lectures resulting from this period were published in 
2011 under the title Spinoza’s Hard Path to Freedom. 
Our discussion traverses three parts: the first section of the article considers the 
Spinozist ontology and ethology that Gatens mobilises in her work on ‘imaginary 
bodies,’ and explains how her reading of Spinoza’s philosophical system also pro-
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vides Gatens with a framework for new thinking about power, freedom and right 
in a feminist context; part 2 elaborates some consequences of this framework for 
conceiving the social roles and potentialities of institutions; and finally, the essay 
outlines some recent directions taken by Gatens towards expanding this theorisa-
tion, by refocussing her attention specifically on institutions of genre. Gatens has 
begun to articulate a Spinozan theory of art, which she elaborates in the context 
of the “philosophical literature” of George Eliot who, incidentally, also produced 
original translations of Spinoza’s works.
1.  IMAGINARY BODIES: POWER, FREEDOM AND RIGHT
Gatens’ work is respected amongst scholars of Spinoza for its careful interpreta-
tion of the Spinozan system, and its feminist re-assessment of the political and 
transformative potential of a key ontological and epistemological commitment in 
Spinoza’s Ethics. This concerns his premise that the mind is the idea of the body, 
that mind and body are parallel attributes of a single Substance or Nature; and 
consequently, that particular ways of imagining, thinking and knowing are inti-
mately woven together with particular modes of embodiment as ways of being in 
the world.2 Gatens makes clear the ethical consequences of this ontological com-
mitment, even if such consequences were confounding, to Europeans at least, in 
Spinoza’s own time.3 Whereas Spinoza is designated a rationalist in view of the 
way he associates the imagination and the emotions with the “first kind of knowl-
edge,” which is “a cause of falsity” and therefore is inferior and will gradually be 
superseded by the active exercise of reason in the “second” and “third kinds of 
knowledge”4, Gatens provides a challenging re-vision and revaluation of the cen-
tral and productive role played by the imagination in Spinoza’s philosophy. In her 
view, Spinozan imagination is not simply a source of error but, more productively, 
functions as a necessary aid to reason. 
One of Gatens’ signal achievements is to bring into sharper relief the possible 
kinds of freedom and right—and the corresponding potential for empowerment 
and liberation—that accompany Spinoza’s ethics.5 She does this in consider-
ation of Spinoza’s philosophical commitment to substance monism in the prin-
ciple that the mind is the idea of the body (rather than a separate and distinc-
tive substance). In this respect, her work is important in the context of Spinoza 
studies for showing how Spinoza’s critique of dogmatic theologies and despotic 
governments, and his treatment of ethics, is intrinsically linked to his views on 
the cognitive role of the imagination. Gatens’ work is furthermore innovative for 
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its original feminist application of Spinoza’s ‘ethology’ in contemporary political 
contexts where dominant cultural norms often clash with more formal notions 
of justice and right. Like Gilles Deleuze and Pierre Macherey, Gatens asserts Spi-
noza’s therapeutic approach to the problem of domination.6 The concept of free-
dom in Spinoza does not correspond to the sovereign exercise of free will, but 
rather refers to the struggle through which an individual or a community strives 
to understand its sources of determination, endeavours to comprehend and so 
to orchestrate the relational causes of its being, and so to enhance its affective 
capacities and individual powers of existence. 
Deleuze emphasises how, according to Spinoza’s account in the scholia of Part IV 
of the Ethics, affects can be “joyful” if they produce an enriched or more complex 
state of being in which an individual’s capacities or potentiality is enhanced; or 
they can be “sad,” if an individual is impacted in a way that is demeaning, detri-
mental and weakening.7 Additionally, affects can be either passive or active experi-
ences of relationship. If affects are passive, they will be unbidden and unselected; 
they may bring a fortuitous joy, but equally may result in sadness. But if they are 
active, they will be the result of a developed understanding how bodies can com-
bine or be combined in a joyful manner that enhances their affective potential.8 In 
her explanation of the Spinozan system, Gatens provides a necessary correction 
to the predilection of a certain strain of contemporary Affect Theory that draws 
heavily from Deleuzian philosophy (and she targets the work of Brian Massumi 
especially).9 She is critical of the autonomic theory of affect that claims Spinoza 
as its precursor, but which problematically reinstates an implied mind-body du-
alism completely at odds with Spinoza’s ontology and epistemology and which, 
by extension, is incongruent with his ethics and politics (at least as these have 
been articulated by Gatens and other readers of Spinoza, including Deleuze him-
self). Massumi prioritises corporeal affect over mental cognition and conceives 
of affect as a-subjective, autonomic, and asocial in the sense that it is unbound 
by meaning or signification.10 For Massumi, freedom is found in the limitless in-
terconnectivity of affect and openness to the endless transformations that result 
from contact and affective sensation; but as Gatens emphasises, for Spinoza, free-
dom rather concerns the reasoned development of certain kinds of joyful affect 
through the constructive stimulus of the active imagination, rather than the free 
accommodation of all kinds of affective influence and creative transformation.11 
She thereby reasserts both Spinoza’s particular kind of rationalism that allows a 
productive role for the emotions and imagination, and his political potential. She 
warns against the potential depoliticisation or passive nihilism that corresponds 
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with a simplistic philosophy of the social body conceived in terms of the circu-
lation and passionate investment of affect: as principally material without cor-
responding ideational content, as non-conceptual, a-signifying, un-thought and 
irrational.
For Gatens, then, freedom from domination by relations that are felt as detri-
mental and demeaning involves the careful cultivation, through the affective 
imagination coupled with reasoned deliberation, of “joyful transitions.”12 Rather 
than being subject to passive affects and the poorly formed or false ideas that 
accompany them, the free individual strives towards a more active understand-
ing of the conditions enabling considered practices of self-formation and social 
constitution. Freedom here is much less a wilful state of being unfettered, than it 
is a developmental practice or an experimental process over time, through which 
the experiential imagination is actively directed towards coming to understand 
how complex social relations operate as natural causes of determination. Based 
on this understanding, the free individual endeavours, as much as is possible, ac-
tively to organise or to orchestrate these determining relations through practices 
of mindfulness and judicious affective comportment. Gatens elaborates how, in 
this process, the imagination can be a source of misapprehension and falsehood; 
but it can also (alternatively) be a source of invention and creative cognition that 
aids the development of adequate understanding.13 
Writing on the subject of “imaginary bodies,” Gatens explains how a person’s 
image or idea of embodiment shapes their subjectivity and influences their po-
tential for various kinds of sociability.14 “For a Spinozist,” she writes, “to think 
differently is, by definition, to exist differently: one’s power of thinking is insepa-
rable from one’s power of existing, and vice-versa.”15 How I conceive myself as 
embodied culturally and historically, my conception of my humanity and that of 
others, my experiential comprehension of my body’s capacities or limitations for 
joining in sociable relations with other bodies or selves, and my forecasting of 
the impact of my actions upon those others and of their impact upon me, all will 
play a vital role in social comportment and the ethical quality of collective life. 
My capacity to imagine myself in diverse situations and relations with others is a 
primary resource for my processes of knowledge-formation, moral deliberation 
and eventual conduct. The adequacy of the embodied ideas I form, together with 
the adequacy of my affective image of other bodies I encounter, and of the char-
acter of the body politic in which we participate, directly influences the quality 
of my social contribution and my ability to engage others in behaviours that are 
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respectful.16 Furthermore, our collective imaginative efforts to comprehend and 
map the nature of our extensive inter-relations and the ways in which these can be 
supported by social institutions tempers individual and shared capacities for the 
predictive amelioration of those relations and institutions into the future, so that 
they potentially can find a more joyful expression as transparent causes bringing 
maximal benefit and minimal harm. Individual and collective bodies are, then, not 
“given” but rather “imagined”—and correspondingly, personal and social imagi-
naries are shaped by material realities experienced affectively as corporeal con-
straints and potentiality. 
This Spinozist framework enables Gatens to think in a novel way about issues of 
feminist agency in contexts where women (and men) may experiment using cor-
poreal strategies for transforming misogynist imaginaries. Writing on intimate vi-
olence, Gatens explains how acts such as rape rely upon a social context in which 
female bodies can be imagined as (permissibly) violable according to implicit 
cultural norms, even when principles of women’s corporeal integrity and human 
rights circulate as sanctioned and institutionalised knowledge in that same so-
cial structure.17 A society’s effective resistance to such crimes against women’s 
humanity therefore requires intervention at the level of the social imaginary, just 
as much as it calls for robust enforcement of the institutions that ostensibly ex-
ist to safeguard all bodies from harm. Although women are not responsible for 
masculinist imaginaries, Gatens points to the activist consequences of the Spi-
nozan principle that ways of being are braided together with ways of conceiving: 
feminists can make use of the constitutive dimension of the imagination to direct 
the incremental (or “molecular”) transformation of dominant social imaginaries 
and associated modes of affective comportment that historically and continually 
have been detrimental and damaging to women. By imagining and then describing 
oneself differently, one begins to understand oneself and ones’ active capacities 
differently, and then to feel differently in relation to others. It becomes possible 
to create and direct alternate flows of affect and of affection in social relations, 
potentially also encouraging the emergence of alternative formations of power 
and knowledge.18 
Corporeal practices of affective and imaginative agency provide a crucial resource 
for collective processes of rational interrogation—and possible expansion—of 
the social limitations imposed when sexist and racist imaginaries prevail, for ex-
ample when female or black bodies imagine (or are made to conceive) themselves 
as impermissible in certain spaces, including knowledge spaces. Relational and 
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systemic transformations can occur when gendered and racialised bodies who 
are systematically treated inequitably come to imagine alternative existences, and 
so to seek opportunities that enhance their capacities for becoming visible: ap-
pearing and mattering and being heard, in those same situations and locations 
where previously they have been made to feel they shouldn’t appear or be taken 
into account.19  Here, when realised through the self-conscious effort of creative 
imagination, the developing adequacy or activity of a reasoned understanding of 
corporeal right and agency—and a corresponding increase in potentiality or em-
powerment - triumphs over the passive experience of rightlessness and power-
lessness, and possibly prompts a shift in relational capacities, a shift in relations 
of power. Ways of knowing and ways of being or acting in the world are, then, 
braided together in ways that are ethically and politically significant. Particularly in 
Collective Imaginings, co-authored with Genevieve Lloyd, we learn how a Spinozist 
theorisation of the complex role played by the imagination in social organisation 
and liberation implies a whole political theory of institutions and their good gov-
ernance, which values art and everyday life as imaginative sources of institutional 
critique, creativity and flourishing just as much as it attends to the juridical and 
empirical sciences of human social order. 
2. INSTITUTIONS AND THE GOVERNANCE OF IMAGINATION
We have seen how Gatens finds in Spinoza a political and an ethical process that 
turns on the development of active understanding from the productive power of 
imagination and corresponds with an increased potential for actively determin-
ing one’s ways of being in associative relations with others. However, it is perhaps 
still somewhat unclear what Spinoza’s intertwining of epistemology and ontol-
ogy portends for the collective structures, institutions, and processes of political 
society. Spinoza’s idea that “the right of the individual is co-extensive with its 
determinate power”20 has influenced some prominent strains of contemporary 
political thought including Deleuze and Foucault, the Althusser School with Negri 
and Balibar as key contemporary thinkers, and socialist theology after Feuerbach. 
Nonetheless, the assertion of equivalence between rights and powers confounds 
classic conceptions of state sovereignty and political justice, among other things, 
and provides no apparent solution to some of our most pressing contemporary 
political problems. For some, this raises doubts about the adequacy of Spinoza’s 
political philosophy.21 For example, how is the protection of fragile bodies able to 
be secured, if the right to persevere is linked with a power of endurance? If the 
power of a sovereign state is aligned with its right, then how are we to think about 
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contested sovereignties after empire? Gatens, including in her collaboration with 
Lloyd, makes important inroads to Spinozist political philosophy by drawing out 
for us the normative philosophy of political community and collective responsi-
bility we may discern in Spinoza’s writings.22 In so doing, she articulates crucial 
conceptual resources for tackling such troubling and prescient questions. 
In her discussion of Spinoza’s “hard path to freedom,” Gatens highlights the prob-
lem of “collective social, political and theological imaginaries whose resistance to 
critique can be formidable.”23 This is because, for Spinoza, human beings are nec-
essarily social and therefore the opportunities for an individual to actualise his or 
her power and virtue in becoming free are always socially conditioned. Gatens ar-
gues, just as Spinoza recommends individual bodies enact a therapeutic approach 
to the imagination in a quest for personal liberty through the pursuit of self-other 
understanding and knowledge of one’s determining causes, he likewise encourag-
es a remedial and ethological approach to the collective social, political and theo-
logical imaginaries that invest the body politic. “For Spinoza,” Gatens writes, “it is 
the distinction between grasping law as arbitrary command and law as knowledge 
that marks the difference between human freedom and human bondage.”24 The 
flourishing of reason and the actualisation of human capacities—the capacity to 
understand, to be joyful—requires good governance towards collective liberation. 
Spinoza suggests democracy is the ideal form of government because “the true 
aim of government is liberty”;25 however, because the remedy of collective fanta-
sies or falsehoods ingrained in a society takes time and general conditions of se-
curity and education, in the Tractacus Theologico-Politicus he favours both a strong 
state and organised religion to combat the unruly passions of a multitude that 
does not have good understanding of its active capacities for self-determination. 
But at the same time, he urges a cultivated resistance to the monopoly of power 
by despotic governments and dogmatic theologies. To accommodate this ambiva-
lence, Gatens draws from Spinoza a theory of institutional design. In doing so, she 
opens up a middle path between interpreters of Spinoza such as Toni Negri, who 
can seem over-optimistic about the self-generating rationality and revolutionary 
capacity of the multitude, and readers such as Yirmiyahu Yovel who considers the 
multitude is by its nature incapable of rising above the passionate imaginary.26 
Gatens argues that on Spinoza’s account of good governance, “there should not 
be any structural barriers to prevent the passionate citizen from becoming more 
reasonable.”27 A secure state, and the rule of law, protected by effective and trans-
parent institutions whose purpose and operation is not mystified but rather is 
well understood in society, are means by which “a reasonable government can 
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guarantee the consistency of cause and effect, act and consequence, in all social 
dealings.”28   
According to Spinoza, belief cannot be compelled.29 To avoid despotic rule, a state 
must be able to mediate ideological conflict without favouring a particular set of 
beliefs over the free exercise of others. Spinoza’s approach to this problem is to 
posit a universal set of organising principles that all citizens must abide by in a 
well-ordered state, even while each individual is free to interpret these freely and 
to live by them in whatever way suits.30  Gatens elaborates:
The diversity of ways in which the seven principles [of Universal faith] 
may be interpreted acknowledges the power of the sovereign to dictate 
what shall count as permissible and impermissible action at the same 
time that it accommodates the different beliefs of citizens. Without a se-
cure state and a stable moral code the development of human powers and 
knowledge is impossible.31
This Spinozist framework for conceiving the mediating and binding role of the 
state as it upholds individual freedoms in the exercise of diverse beliefs and sup-
ports the incremental and contextual evolution of reason according to differential 
individual capabilities, bears also upon Gatens’ own conceptualisations of politi-
cal community and public responsibility, social transformation, and law.32 In an 
interview published in 2011, she explains the perspective that enables her to sanc-
tion universal principles of human right, even while having reservations about the 
possibility of finding genuine universality in the context of real human diversity: 
an abstract right can become particularised in its implementation… [ just 
like a] musical score is realised, or particularised, every time a particular 
artist performs it. So there is a score that is written down and universally 
available, but each performance of it, or actualisation of it, is particular.33 
In view of the Spinozan understanding that belief cannot be compelled and indi-
viduals cannot be made reasonable when they lack the kinds of affective capacity, 
imagination and cognitive framework necessary for active understanding and the 
pursuit of joyful affection, Gatens considers that social transformation towards 
more reasonable orders can be achieved only through educational opportunities 
that enable incremental shifts in belief structures:
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Social change happens bit by bit. Individuals can’t change until their so-
cial political context changes, and the social political context can’t change 
until individuals change. The institutions might change a bit, and because 
the institutions have changed a bit then the way that individuals who are 
living under those institutions are formed will change a bit… Possibilities 
for change are inherent to the context and the powers of the individuals 
and the groups in that context.34 
Although social development and the exercise of collective freedom relies upon 
individual and group capacities for directing transformation in specific contexts 
of action, the state nonetheless has a responsible role to play in the design of insti-
tutions that can effectively support and assist individuals to combine their pow-
ers harmoniously and sustain their critical capacities for rational deliberation.35 
Wise polities are those that exhibit a general understanding of the conditions 
and causes that determine citizens to act; the art of wise government involves 
demystifying the purposes and general utility of law and other institutions; and 
it involves building institutions that aim to maximise the rational powers of the 
multitude through education.36 Importantly, education here is best conceived as a 
process of emendation through the use of constructed “exemplars,” and through 
exposure to the varied affective circumstances that constitute diverse (and some-
times conflicting) social imaginaries along with mixed understandings of the de-
termining structures of possible action and of social purpose; its moral dimension 
consists in the opportunity such an education provides for the expansive develop-
ment of the sympathetic imagination, when we learn how to take different per-
spectives and alternative reasons for action into account when deliberating upon 
our own conditions of determination and choices for action. In this context, one 
of the key responsibilities of the state concerns the generation and communica-
tion of appropriate narratives for the expression of the historical complexity and 
diversity of the social imaginary, especially as this “endures through time and 
so becomes increasingly embedded in all our institutions, our judicial systems, 
our national narratives, our founding fictions, our cultural traditions.”37 In other 
words, the state is responsible not only for coordinating—and sometimes orches-
trating - the regulatory norms that underpin and intersect with all other institu-
tional settings, but also for endeavouring to make transparent to the citizenry 
that such norms are fabricated from original fictions that have come to exert a 
persuasive pull upon the social imaginary. These useful fictions are neither uni-
versal in their expression of social reality and value, nor essentially or naturally 
reasonable in themselves. If they are to continue to be accepted as reasonable 
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patterns for the warp and weft of our collective institutional fabric, they must be 
perpetually tested according to the experimental tools of adequate understanding 
furnished by the sympathetic imagination. Thus, Gatens and Lloyd write:
The social imaginary may be inescapable, but it is not, for all that, fixed. Its 
reiteration and repetition through time opens possibilities for it to be (re)
constituted differently. The collective transformation of the social imagi-
nary cannot be ‘thought’ voluntaristically or relativistically as pure (re)
invention of the past. Rather, it must be thought collectively, which is to 
say it must be thought and negotiated with actually existing different oth-
ers in historical time.38
This perspective on the embedded but dynamic nature of institutional design and 
reshaping informs significant aspects of Gatens’ political philosophy. For exam-
ple, it is applied implicitly by Gatens and MacKinnon in their edited collection of 
critical feminist essays that examine the scope for ensuring that Australian insti-
tutions acknowledge gender difference and deliver more equitable outcomes.39 
It also appears in Gatens’ work on the connection between social imaginaries, 
cultural reformation, ‘embodied responsibility,’ and the potential for narrative 
transformation, particularly as these apply to exclusionary structures such as pa-
triarchy and colonialism.40 Throughout her writings, we see persistent evidence of 
her interest in the normative sway of political ideas that have simultaneous alter-
nate powers: to subdue the passions of the multitude that receives them unthink-
ingly; or to liberate the rational multitude by revealing more adequate modes of 
understanding about the conditions and causes that determine social action.   
Religion, too, is of interest to Gatens insofar as it can demonstrate an extraor-
dinary normative influence upon individual minds and the collective imaginary. 
She finds in the works of Spinoza, Feuerbach and Eliot a view that religion is an 
illusion, but one able to reveal important truths about human fears, motives and 
aspirations. Though the dogmatic tendencies of religious power must be cause 
for permanent vigilance, Gatens notes that religion can provide organising prin-
ciples for the egoistic imagination and the unruly passions. Spinoza insists on the 
affective (rather than rational) power of religion: it works by “moving men… its 
aim being to appeal to and engage men’s fantasy and imagination.”41 Religion can 
supply compelling fictional narratives that ultimately can encourage sympathetic, 
reasonable and ethical conduct, leading to general social equity and harmony. But 
historical and contemporary evidence shows how religious fictions are charac-
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teristically mystifying and typically diminish the active capacity of the multitude 
for exercising reasoned judgement through understanding the sources of their 
determination to act. For this reason, Spinoza holds that theology and philosophy 
are distinct domains of knowledge that have discrete objects, methodologies and 
aims.42 In her consideration of human potential for social liberation through the 
rational organisation of constitutive affect approached through the sympathetic 
imagination, Gatens attends specifically to the philosophical role of “deliberative 
fictions,” including imaginative universal “exemplars” such as the “free man,” 
which she argues can effectively enhance the collective power of human beings 
to become free.43 She describes these as fictions that, while affirming their fictive 
status, nevertheless work to demystify the confusions of the imagination about 
cause and effect, and means and ends.44 Unlike religion, then, in which imaginary 
exemplars function as a substitute for reason, “the philosopher uses the imagina-
tion as an aid to reason.”45 
Philosophy can therefore be a source of “deliberative fictions,” sometimes extend-
ing to state-sanctioned expressions of social purpose and reason in institutional 
forms, such as aspirational policy statements. In my own philosophical work I 
have aimed to construct a deliberative fiction around the notion of “excolonial-
ism,” as a non-actual but potential form of society that departs imaginatively and 
qualitatively from the conditions of the colonial-type society that we continue 
to inhabit in Australia, and in many respects, falsely imagine as our natural or 
inevitable condition.46 However, philosophy per se is not the only catalogue of 
“deliberative fictions”: in her more recent work Gatens turns to literature, and 
especially to the “philosophical novels” of George Eliot, to draw out a Spinozan 
conception of art—that is, a conception of art as philosophy - with a role to play 
in the enlargement of individual and collective freedoms. 
3. THE DELIBERATIVE IMAGINATION: SPINOZA AND ELIOT 
Throughout her professional career, Gatens has been notably devoted to better 
understanding the operation and effect of genre on the gendered formation and 
valuation of scientific, social and moral knowledge.47 Over the past decade, her 
investigation of the imbricated epistemological relationship of science and art—
of truth and imagination—has been trained closely upon the moral potential of a 
generative connection between philosophy and literature. Gatens focusses most 
particularly—though not exclusively48—upon the combination of these two genres 
evident in the writings of Marian Evans, whose fiction was published under the 
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masculine pseudonym of George Eliot. Gatens’ project is not only to elaborate the 
influence upon the literary Eliot of philosophers including Spinoza and Feuerbach 
(whom Eliot translated, along with the works of David Strauss),49 but also to read 
Eliot as a philosopher in her own right; and thereby to reframe and reconceive 
philosophy itself, as “a genre and a practice” of thought imbued with considerable 
methodological diversity.50 In so doing, Gatens seeks to deepen an appreciation of 
philosophy’s gendered status (thereby extending the feminist philosophical proj-
ect begun early in her career), “in order to acknowledge the force of the full range 
of institutions and social conventions at work in genre allocation.”51
George Eliot is widely celebrated as a “great realist novelist,” but her realism has 
also opened her to charges of naivety in her presentation of a transparently self-
evident reality, as well as allegations of bourgeois moralism as an effect of the par-
tisan perspective she unavoidably brings to bear upon her literary observations 
and orchestrations.52 Gatens seeks to counter both charges and re-vision Eliot as 
a naturalistic philosopher whose painstaking accounts of the details and events 
of ordinary life present everyday images of people confronting common moral 
problems, and responding creatively to them. Sometimes their responses are de-
liberately reasoned, in clear-sighted appreciation of the set of determining causes 
that have brought them to their current situation and the outcomes they hope will 
prevail; but most often Eliot depicts characters struggling with situations they do 
not well understand:
They are fleshy, imaginative and passionate beings who lack self-mastery, 
self-discipline and self-knowledge and have, at best, only a partial grasp of 
their context and the complex, interconnected chains of causes that ani-
mate both it and their own actions.53 
This causes them to be affected and to affect others in ways they have not explic-
itly willed, with outcomes they cannot securely predict. Eliot’s characters typi-
cally find there is no ready-made moral script to guide their actions. The reasoned 
solutions they may find will instead be developed through the gradual coming-to-
awareness they exhibit in the course of their reflection upon the consequences 
of the choices they have made. According to Gatens, Eliot is “concerned, in the 
absence of a God, to give morality a naturalistic grounding. Imagination, sympa-
thy and affect are the components from which she builds her ethical stance.”54 
Gatens then considers Eliot’s approach to realism as a “self-conscious narrative 
strategy” that draws on Spinoza’s philosophy to “facilitate an understanding of 
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realism where the capacity to imagine is intrinsic to our apprehension of reality.”55
Gatens takes very seriously Eliot’s own assertion that her novels comprise “sim-
ply a set of experiments in life.”56 She avers: “Knowledge is gained through reflect-
ing on and organising our experience. It is this account of knowledge that gives 
rise to Eliot’s distinctive empiricism and her preference for the experimental 
method.”57 Eliot’s approach to literature as experimental philosophy can be un-
derstood in two ways. First, her novels present fictional individuals dealing with 
real-world complex social problems—including anti-Semitism (Daniel Deronda), 
infanticide, sexual exploitation (Adam Bede), domestic violence, alcoholism (Ja-
net’s Redemption), and the right of women to education (Middlemarch)—and trial-
ling interventions to specific moral situations. In this respect, Eliot’s novels are 
an imaginative catalogue of moral and social experimentation concerning pos-
sible responses to real issues and a creative exploration of the potential benefits 
and pitfalls of responsive actions. At the same time, her novels reveal the affective 
motivations underscoring the deliberative processes embarked upon by charac-
ters as they struggle experimentally with the worldly situations in which they find 
themselves. Secondly, Gatens suggests Eliot deliberately sought to represent her 
moral philosophy through fiction, as a most effective way to engage her read-
ers’ sympathetic imagination and provide them with conceptual resources hav-
ing a potential application in their own real-world comprehensions of, and in-
vestigations with, complex social and moral problems. Identifying imaginatively 
and sympathetically with the characters in Eliot’s fictional situations may assist 
readers to better predict the various possible outcomes of their actions, as they 
come to better “understand human life and value through careful observation, re-
flection on experience, and sympathetic comparisons between self and others.”58 
Choices made prudently will arise in processes of moral experimentation that 
must, to a significant extent, proceed in accordance with careful analysis of the 
determining conditions and in the light of imagined outcomes. Moral decisions 
can be tempered by the rich resources of imagination afforded to readers capable 
of sympathising with the experiences of (fictional) others, as they endeavour to 
pursue favourable endings: the “ideal associations, characteristic of the artistic 
imagination, help create representations with the force to trigger memory, engage 
emotion, and provide fresh insight into the subtle interconnections between self, 
others, and the world.”59 In this way, “the painstaking tasks of observing, collect-
ing and reporting empirical facts” are combined with Eliot’s genius for “selection 
and recombination in order to create a work that shows the human condition in a 
new light,” and “Eliot’s ethical realism can be understood as offering her readers 
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a secular revelation that seeks to challenge the significance of common human 
experiences and promote love of one’s neighbour.”60 
Far from being merely an especially fastidious recounting of the self-evident ma-
terial world, then, Eliot’s naturalism and empiricism is re-visioned by Gatens as 
thoroughly imbued with attention to that which is not obviously apparent to the 
casual observer. The intricate detail of Eliot’s observations is then reconceived 
as part of a narrative strategy that encourages readers to look again “at what was 
thought to be ordinary, uneventful, or mundane, in order to appreciate the ex-
traordinary intricacy of human interconnectedness, or the long chain of causal 
links between present and past conditions that connect the commonplace to mo-
mentous events.”61 This interpretation allows Eliot a significant critical impetus, 
and indeed Gatens presents Eliot as using her fiction for artfully and deliberately 
“unsettling and realigning the affective charge of traditional narratives in which 
moral feeling and action are embedded.”62 She sees this as a methodological con-
sequence of Eliot’s distinctive conception of truth in art since, for Eliot, truth 
does not inhere in the material correspondence of the representation with exter-
nal reality, but in the adequacy of an understanding of the affective causes and 
conditions that shape the contexts of judgement and action. Art has a capacity 
to contribute to ethical judgement by making more visible, or apparent, what we 
need to see, to experience through the example of others, if we are to become 
more joyful—that is, more reasonable: 
Art, for Eliot, always involves revelation and vision: seeing anew what was 
taken to be ordinary… Art is not discovered or found but vividly imagined, 
realised, materialised, through passion, memory and insight. It is this ac-
count of artistic creation that defines Eliot’s distinctive realism—a real-
ism that embraces passion, imagination and memory, as the material bases 
out of which we strive to know ourselves and refashion our contexts of 
action.63 
This is the sense in which Gatens understands Eliot conceives her art as philoso-
phy, in that it deliberately and self-consciously probes the scope and adequacy of 
philosophical concepts. 
Key among these is the concept of imagination, which is typically sidelined in 
the history of philosophy as a source of error and falsity. However, for Eliot (as 
for Gatens), the imagination is central to morality, since the sympathetic imagi-
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nation is what connects individuals to each other. Imagination and emotion are 
fundamental to processes of moral deliberation, because they constitute a basis 
for moral interaction and the incentive or drive to act ethically.64 One of Gatens’ 
ambitions is to demonstrate how Eliot’s theory of imagination converges with 
the views of Spinoza and Feuerbach.65 Eliot distinguishes two kinds of imagina-
tion: the first involves arbitrary combinations of observations drawn from fan-
ciful imaginings without attention to reality; and the second involves the disci-
plined and discerning selection of ideal associations, directed towards expressing 
a truthful account of reality. Gatens argues, for Eliot, “the power of discerning the 
difference is the mark of a refined, disciplined imagination and is as important to 
gaining moral knowledge as it is to gaining scientific knowledge.”66 Accordingly, 
in direct contrast to frivolous art forms that merely “encourage false sympathies 
and shallow moral sensibilities,”67 Gatens claims that, for Eliot, the fundamental 
purpose of literature is to evoke fellow feeling through the sympathetic imagina-
tion. Her novels thereby aspire to provide a conceptual ground for moral com-
munity, which relies firmly upon sympathy and aspires towards positive forms of 
conduct and relationship that express a solution to the key moral philosophical 
question: how ought we to live? 
In the latest phase of her philosophical career, Gatens finds in Eliot an interpre-
tation of Spinoza sympathetic to her own, in which the imagination plays a cen-
tral role in social formations and in the advancement of moral knowledge. Gat-
ens’ philosophical reading of Eliot is both a contribution to Eliot studies, and a 
contribution to Spinoza studies. Commentators have hotly debated—and often 
strongly denied—the possibility of defining a Spinozan aesthetics. Yet, through 
her reading of the philosophical literature of George Eliot, and in the light of her 
argument that Eliot uses literature to express the Spinozan system in an alternate 
form, Gatens is able to draw out a theory of art implied in Spinoza’s philosophy. 
However, at the same time, Gatens is careful to insist upon Eliot’s unique and 
innovative philosophical contribution, which cannot be reduced to a mere ap-
plication of Spinoza’s or Feuerbach’s insights through the (then) more socially 
sanctioned feminine form of literary expression. For Gatens, “Eliot’s insistence 
on the importance of historical context to the development and character of mo-
rality and religion represents a philosophically significant advance on the views of 
Spinoza and Feuerbach.”68  Accordingly, for Gatens, Eliot does not simply re-pres-
ent Spinoza’s philosophy in literary form, but rather “develops notions latent in 
Spinoza’s philosophy that open new paths for conceiving of the relation between 
ethics and art.”69 Gatens’ turn to Eliot is, then, a continuation of her longer term 
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project of feminist philosophical historiography and her questioning of the role of 
gender in the ascription of genre.
In an interview published in 2011, Gatens remarks how, when bringing previously 
unconnected writers into association, “something strange happens, and the hope 
is this relation will engender new possibilities for thought. It allows one to think 
something new because these writers are not usually brought together or thought 
together.”70 According to Gatens, Eliot’s novels are “exemplars of an interven-
tionist practice that aims to transform the ethical frame of human action through 
a forceful revisioning of reality.”71 The same could be said of Gatens’ philosophy, 
which is a formidable force for the emendation of the ethical intellect. As an exem-
plary feminist thinker, Gatens’ work shines with the careful integrity of someone 
who seeks to intuit, imagine and reason, as fully as possible, a truthful or adequate 
understanding of the nature of sexual difference, collective sexual imaginaries, 
and the complex system of power relations that are their determining causes. Ad-
ditionally, as an imaginative philosopher whose associative methodology creates 
new possibilities for thought, Gatens presents a re-conception of philosophy as a 
genre and a practice that strives to exert a creative power capable of changing and 
reshaping reality itself. 
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